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RISK ASSESSMENT ALGORITHMS: THE ANSWER TO AN 
INEQUITABLE BAIL SYSTEM? 
Richard F. Lowden* 
Debate over pretrial detention began long before ratification of 
the Eighth Amendment, tracing its roots to the early English bail 
system. Despite this, approaches to the system have largely 
remained stagnant since passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 
which contains a series of procedural directives that model bail-
setting practices for the majority of jurisdictions today. However, 
many courts have begun to insinuate that the current methods 
represent a flawed, archaic, and biased system—burdening both 
defendants and the community. A rise in the use of algorithms in 
other areas of the criminal justice system has led some jurisdictions, 
including Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, to abandon 
traditional procedures in favor of data-driven risk assessment tools, 
yielding promising results for the future of bail reform. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................222 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM ...............................................................................223 
A. Brief History and Criticism of Modern Practices for 
Setting Bail ....................................................................224 
B. Rethinking Risk Assessment Factors Through the Use of 
Algorithms .....................................................................228 
III. THE PSA AND MECKLENBURG COUNTY ..............................233 
                                                 
*J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2019. The author 
would like to thank the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology staff and 
editors for their continual feedback and support, namely Stephanie Barickman, 
Erin Larson, Joseph Hjelt, and Jordan Luebkemann. The author would also like 
to thank Professor Jessica Smith for her valuable insight as well as Lauren Bragg 
for her discerning editorial remarks throughout the process of writing this Recent 
Development. 
222 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. [VOL. 19: 221 
A. The PSA’s Approach to Bail Reform .............................233 
B. Implementation in Mecklenburg County and Positive 
Outcomes ......................................................................238 
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR AN ALGORITHMIC APPROACH TO BAIL 
REFORM ..............................................................................241 
A. Benefits to Defendants, the Criminal Justice System, and 
the Community ..............................................................241 
B. Cautionary Measures: Accounting for Algorithmic Bias 
and Systemic Limitations ..............................................244 
C. Future Steps and Policy Measures in Pursuit of Reform
 ......................................................................................248 
V. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................250 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Excessive bail shall not be required.”1 While the opening words 
to the Eighth Amendment may—at face value—appear quite clear, 
their meaning has sparked a wide variety of interpretations from 
both scholars and courts for decades. Despite the language of the 
Eighth Amendment, developed case law affirms the principle that 
an individual does not possess a constitutional right to be released 
on bail.2 But for whom is this provision intended? In the federal 
system, certain defendants found guilty of crimes enumerated in the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984 may be statutorily barred from release.3 On 
the opposite end of the spectrum are defendants who remain 
detained pretrial, not because of the severity of their crime or the 
risk they present to the community, but due to a systemic flaw in the 
                                                 
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 2 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754–55 (1987). 
 3 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3) (2012). The Bail Reform Act of 1984 enhanced 
protections for defendants held in custody solely for failure to satisfy monetary 
conditions for release. However, the Act stipulates that it is presumed no 
conditions are appropriate to ensure a defendant’s appearance or the safety of the 
community if an individual has been charged with any of the enumerated offenses 
listed in the subsection. The most notable exceptions include offenses with a 
maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more, specific crimes involving 
minor victims, and drug trafficking activities. Id. 
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traditional bail system as it stands today—they simply cannot afford 
release.4 In searching for an equitable solution to bail reform that 
maintains public safety, risk assessment algorithms5 have risen to 
the forefront of the discussion. These algorithms seek to reform 
existing methods of pretrial release by lowering crime rates and 
reducing jail populations while enhancing judicial efficiency in the 
process. 
This Recent Development argues in favor of an algorithmic 
approach to bail reform and introduces the steps that may be taken 
to correct inequities in the pretrial release system utilized by the 
majority of jurisdictions today. Part II provides a brief history of the 
bail system and the emergence of algorithms as part of the criminal 
process. Part III assesses the real-world effectiveness and impact of 
bail algorithms through Mecklenburg County’s implementation of 
the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment. Part IV outlines 
the benefits of employing bail algorithms, while also recognizing 
the possibility of bias and systemic limitations in the methods 
themselves. Finally, Part V concludes by identifying future policy 
measures to effectively utilize algorithms in bail reform efforts. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
Modern practices of setting bail reached a plateau with the 
enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1984.6 “Bail schedules,” which 
standardize monetary amounts of bail “based on the offense 
charged, regardless of the characteristics of an individual 
                                                 
 4 See ARNOLD FOUND., Judge Regan Miller (June 2015), 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/videos/judge-regan-miller/; Jennifer Brookland 
& Frank Stasio, Mecklenburg County Takes a New Look at Bail Reform, WUNC 
(Dec. 5, 2017), http://wunc.org/post/mecklenburg-county-takes-new-look-bail-
reform#stream/0. 
 5 Risk assessment algorithms are tools used to predict future behavior among 
incarcerated defendants. In the criminal justice system, these algorithms are 
chiefly used to narrowly estimate an individual’s likelihood of committing new 
criminal activity and assess risk of flight. See Vignesh Ramachandran, Exploring 
the Use of Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, STANFORD ENGINEERING 
(May 3, 2017), https://engineering.stanford.edu/magazine/article/exploring-use-
algorithms-criminal-justice-system. 
 6 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3148 (2012). 
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defendant,”7 have been utilized as the predominant mechanism 
governing pretrial detention procedures and have remained 
unchallenged for nearly half a century.8 Although these schedules 
seem to promote equal treatment of defendants, they have 
nonetheless come under attack for failing to effectively satisfy the 
aims of pretrial detention outlined in the Bail Reform Act.9 The use 
of algorithms as a tool to assess the risk of individual defendants 
pending trial has gained support in numerous “pilot” jurisdictions 
throughout the country10 and now begs the question of whether 
nation-wide adoption is the next logical step in bail reform efforts. 
The answer to this question requires reviewing the history of bail 
and the shortcomings of the existing system. 
A. Brief History and Criticism of Modern Practices for Setting 
Bail 
Historically, determining an appropriate amount for bail pending 
trial has neither been restricted nor monitored.11 Although the Eighth 
Amendment’s “prohibition against excessive bail applies to the 
states via the Fourteenth Amendment,”12 in its early years, the clause 
was applied broadly and afforded little judicial oversight as to what 
amount was considered “excessive.”13 It was not until the 1950s, in 
                                                 
 7 James A. Allen, “Making Bail”: Limiting the Use of Bail Schedules and 
Defining the Elusive Meaning of “Excessive” Bail, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 637, 641 
(2017). 
 8 Id. 
 9 See id. 
 10 Initial pilot sites testing the effectiveness of the Arnold Foundation’s risk 
assessment tool included: several counties in Arizona; multiple courts in 
Colorado; the state of Kentucky; Santa Cruz County, California; and Mecklenburg 
County, North Carolina. Press Release, Arnold Found., Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation Announces New Pilot Sites for Court Risk Assessment Tool (Feb. 20, 
2014), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/home-foundation-areas-focus-resources
-grants-team-jobs-contact-us-laura-john-arnold-foundation-announces-new-
pilot-sites-court-risk-assessme/. 
 11 See generally United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1326–27 (D.C. 
1981) (providing a brief synopsis of the English bail system). 
 12 NEIL P. COHEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE 
PROCESS 104 (LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2014) (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 
(2008)). 
 13 See Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1326–27. 
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the landmark case Stack v. Boyle,14 that the Supreme Court held that 
defendants have a right to challenge the amount of bail set if the 
allocation is significantly higher than the usual amount in 
comparable cases.15 This decision promoted the standardization of 
bail through the formation of the bail schedule, a judicially created 
listing of presumptive bail amounts for certain offenses used in the 
majority of jurisdictions, both state and federal, today.16 These 
schedules may “formally be promulgated through state law, or 
informally employed by local officials.”17 The exact terms of bail 
schedules vary in providing maximum and minimum allocations for 
each offense.18 In varying jurisdictions, the legislature either 
mandates that the stipulated amount be utilized or the amount is 
provided as a suggestion to the judicial official while they exercise 
their discretion in deciding the actual amount.19 Ultimately, these 
bail schedules helped address the concerns of the Stack Court by 
reigning in the wide disparity in bail amounts between defendants 
with comparable charges, while simultaneously affording judges 
some degree of variance within the maximum-minimum band when 
setting bail, given the individual circumstances of each case and 
defendant.20 
The Bail Reform Act of 1966 (“1966 Act”) was the first in a 
series of congressional acts aimed at reforming pretrial bail 
procedure, which resulted in the release of more defendants pretrial 
while creating a “rationale that allowed for increased detention.”21 
The 1966 Act sought to continue the trend of individualized 
discretion set forth in Stack, requiring judicial officers to review 
defendants’ conditions of release after defendants are held in 
custody for a twenty-four hour period.22 While in some respects 
                                                 
 14 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
 15 Id. at 4. 
 16 See Allen, supra note 7. 
 17 Id. at 641 (quoting Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial 
Discretion?, 26 CRIM. JUST. 12, 13 (2011)). 
 18 See id. 
 19 See id. at 642. 
 20 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4; Allen, supra note 7, at 642. 
 21 Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 723, 740–41 (2011). 
 22 See Wayne C. Holcombe, Bail, 73 GEO. L.J. 466, 473 (1984). 
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promoting individual review, the 1966 Act also allowed for the 
continued pretrial detention of defendants who were unable to 
satisfy the imposed conditions, so long as that detention did “not 
amount to punishment or otherwise violate the Constitution.”23 
However, the looming question of what constituted “punishment” in 
the context of pretrial detention remained unanswered in the decades 
following the reform legislation.24 
The most recent major federal reform effort for procedure-
driven pretrial detention came with the passage of the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984 (“1984 Act”).25 The 1984 Act made several key changes 
to the practice of setting bail post-Stack and the 1966 Act, including: 
prohibitions on the practice of imposing absurdly high bail amounts 
in an effort to detain defendants,26 formally authorizing courts to 
consider the danger a defendant may pose to the community or to 
specific individuals,27 and providing hearings to defendants as a 
requirement of pretrial detention.28 The 1984 Act is designed to 
reasonably ensure a defendant will appear in court and will not 
“endanger the safety of any other person or the community” pending 
trial.29 Opponents of the 1984 Act viewed its provisions of statutorily 
authorizing the detention of an individual presumed innocent as a 
violation of a defendant’s due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.30 This element of the 1984 Act was quickly challenged 
in United States v. Salerno31 as being facially unconstitutional.32 
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that pretrial 
detention may serve as “a potential solution to a pressing societal 
                                                 
 23 Id. at 473–74. 
 24 See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (holding a New York 
statute authorizing the detention of juveniles who posed a “serious risk” to the 
community was compatible with due process under the “fundamental fairness” 
test and was not in fact punitive). 
 25 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3148 (2012). 
 26 See id. § 3142(c)(1)(B). 
 27 See id. § 3142(c)(1). 
 28 See id. § 3142(e)(1). 
 29 Id. § 3142(b). 
 30 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 744–45 (1987). 
 31 Id. at 739. 
 32 Id. at 741. 
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problem,”33 permitting the Government to detain an arrestee pending 
trial if it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that no 
release conditions would reasonably assure public safety.34 
Since Salerno, the “potential solution” endorsed by the Court 
has resulted in numerous forms of release, pending trial.35 A 
defendant may be released from pretrial custody by posting a full 
cash bond, by being granted an unsecured bond or conditional 
release, or by the most “traditional” form of bail—through a surety 
bond backed by a professional bond company.36 In cases involving 
release through a surety bond, the bail bonding company “signs a 
promissory note to the court for the full bail amount and then 
charges the defendant a percentage of that full amount as a fee.”37 A 
professional bond company charges defendants a non-refundable 
fee (ordinarily ten percent of the total bond set by the court) to secure 
their release pending trial.38 If a defendant fails to appear for their 
court date, the bond is revoked, and the “bounty hunters” are used 
to recapture the absconding offender.39 This aspect of the modern 
bail system is the subject of a high degree of criticism from both 
scholars and judicial officials.40 The privatization of pretrial release 
and financial incentives for recapture create a “system [which] 
discriminates as bail bondsmen remain part of the political process, 
with interests antithetical to those of the accused.”41 The system is 
further compromised as often defendants’ only option for release 
pending trial is to turn to a bail bonding company. Defendants who 
                                                 
 33 Id. at 747. 
 34 Id. at 752. 
 35 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 12, at 105–09. 
 36 A full cash or surety bond requires the defendant to pay the Court the full 
amount in cash before being released from custody. An unsecured bond allows 
for immediate release upon the defendant’s promise to pay the set amount in full 
in the event they fail to appear for their next court date. Conditional release occurs 
when a judicial official stipulates restrictions on the defendant’s release (such as 
no contact orders or restrictions on travel), on which violation of these conditions 
results in revocation of bail and re-arrest. Id. 
 37 Id. at 106. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See id. at 107. 
 40 See Lydia D. Johnson, The Politics of the Bail System: What’s the Price for 
Freedom?, 17 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 171, 186 (2015). 
 41 Id. 
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are unable to satisfy their bond conditions remain in custody with 
significant costs to the court system and community alike. These 
resulting consequences include a rise in recidivism, correlating to 
the length of a defendant’s incarceration (with as high as a 51% 
greater likelihood of reoffending),42 higher jail populations 
increasing costs to taxpayers in the community,43 and a flooded court 
system hampering efforts to maintain an efficient judiciary.44 These 
criticisms of the current system have led many jurisdictions45 to seek 
more beneficial alternatives to the traditional offense-driven bail 
schedule for the benefit of all actors involved, except for bail 
bonding companies. Algorithms have emerged as one of these 
alternatives, providing a reliable tool for thoroughly analyzing a 
defendant’s risk of flight and danger to the community, and 
supporting a more efficient, equitable bail determination procedure 
in the process. 
B. Rethinking Risk Assessment Factors Through the Use of 
Algorithms 
“One of the most striking innovations in the criminal justice 
system during the past thirty years has been the introduction of 
                                                 
 42 Low-risk defendants remaining in custody for two to three days are “almost 
40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial than equivalent 
defendants held no more than 24 hours.” This recidivism rate climbs to 51 percent 
when a defendant is held for eight to fourteen days. DR. CHRISTOPHER T. 
LOWENKAMP ET AL., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 3 (2013), 
https://www.pretrial.org/download/research/The%20Hidden%20Costs%20of%2
0Pretrial%20Detention%20-%20LJAF%202013.pdf. 
 43 See Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4 (noting Mecklenburg County’s cost of 
$166 to hold defendants in custody, resulting in $113 million spent on inmate 
housing in 2014). 
 44 See Jerold H. Israel, Excessive Criminal Justice Caseloads: Challenging the 
Conventional Wisdom, 48 FLA. L. REV. 761, 761 (1996). 
 45 The most prominent of these jurisdictions include the entire states of Arizona, 
Kentucky, and New Jersey—in addition to some of the country’s largest 
metropolitan areas including Chicago, Illinois, and Charlotte, North Carolina. 
Press Release, Arnold Found., More Than 20 Cities and States Adopt Risk 
Assessment Tool to Help Judges Decide Which Defendants to Detain Prior to 
Trial (Jun. 26, 2015), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/more-than-20-cities-and-
states-adopt-risk-assessment-tool-to-help-judges-decide-which-defendants-to-
detain-prior-to-trial/. 
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actuarial methods—statistical models and software programs—
designed to help judges and prosecutors assess the risk of criminal 
offenders.”46 These algorithms rely on a set order of operations 
similar to a mathematical equation.47 These computer-generated 
formula-based methods have been employed to a limited degree in 
four main areas of the criminal justice system, including: “pretrial 
and bail, sentencing, probation and parole, and juvenile justice.”48 
A policy paper adopted by the Conference of State Court 
Administrators likened risk assessment algorithms to the statistical 
analysis utilized by Oakland A’s general manager Billy Beane, as 
depicted in Michael Lewis’s book, Moneyball.49 Beane’s 
algorithmic approach was discounted by the greater baseball 
community for failing to abide by “long-held practices based on 
intuition and gut-feelings, tradition, and ideology.”50 Similarly, 
opponents of risk assessment algorithms remain skeptical of its 
long-term effectiveness, instead clinging to traditional methods of 
determining pretrial release.51 However, just as Beane’s new method 
turned out to be a more accurate predictor of baseball talent, 
algorithms allow for a more accurate assessment of a defendant’s 
flight risk and danger to the community to be ascertained in the bail 
determination process, despite their departure from the traditional 
practice of following a bail schedule. 
Further, the similar application of algorithms used for what some 
jurisdictions have deemed “predictive policing” has recently been 
subject to a high degree of scrutiny due to its implications on Fourth 
                                                 
 46 DATA & CIVIL RIGHTS, COURTS AND PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS 1 (2015), 
http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2015-1027/Summary_Courts_and_Data.pdf. 
 47 See Jason Tashea, Risk-Assessment Algorithms Challenged in Bail, Sentencing 
and Parole Decisions, ABA J. (Mar. 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine
/article/algorithm_bail_sentencing_parole. 
 48 DATA & CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 46. 
 49 ARTHUR W. PEPIN, 2012-2013 POLICY PAPER: EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL 
RELEASE 5 (2012), https://www.pretrial.org/download/policy-statements/Evidence
%20Based%20Pre-Trial%20Release%20-%20COSCA%202012.pdf. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See J. Mark W. Klingensmith, Computers Laying Down the Law: Will Judges 
Become Obsolete?, 90 FLA. B.J. 80, 81–82 (Jan. 2016), https://www.floridabar.org
/news/tfb-journal/?durl=/DIVCOM/JN/jnjournal01.nsf/Articles/B31E0BE4DA969
63485257F29005A0048. 
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Amendment issues related to reasonable suspicion.52 “Promoted as 
the next smart policing weapon in the war on crime,” proponents 
claim these algorithms will “predict crime before it happens.”53 
Evaluated in this context, “[p]redictive algorithms are not magic 
boxes that divine future crime, but instead probability models of 
future events based on current environmental vulnerabilities.”54 
Critics believe the new technology55 could lead to a society 
analogous to the police state illustrated in the movie Minority 
Report.56 More legalistic concerns arise when examining the 
algorithm’s effect on an individual’s protections and liberties 
granted by the Fourth Amendment.57 Despite concerns arising from 
the use of algorithms in the policing process, their value as a 
supplemental tool to analyze a defendant’s risk of flight and danger 
to the community should not be underestimated. 
In the last few years, numerous jurisdictions have begun 
implementing some form of risk assessment algorithm into their bail 
determination procedures on a trial basis, including the entire states 
of Kentucky, New Jersey, and Arizona, as well as the District of 
                                                 
 52 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable 
Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 285–86 (2012) (noting the impact of predictive 
algorithms on constitutional protections relating to searches, seizures, and 
arrests). 
 53 “[P]redictive policing uses the power of ‘big data’ to isolate patterns in 
otherwise random acts.” By using information gathered from specific occurrences 
such as arrests and incident reports, cross-referenced with other variables such as 
the addresses of known gang members, past calls for service to law enforcement, 
and areas of frequent violent activity. Id. at 261, 265–66. 
 54 Id. at 314. 
 55 See Shibani Mahtani, Chicago Police Take a Page from “Minority Report”, 
WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chicago-
police-take-a-page-from-minority-report-1494581400. 
 56 Minority Report is a neo-noir science-fiction movie directed by Steven 
Spielberg and starring Tom Cruise, in which crime is eradicated due to the 
“Precrime” police unit’s ability to predict crimes before they occur. MINORITY 
REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002). 
 57 See Katherine Freeman, Recent Development, Algorithmic Injustice: How 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court Failed to Protect Due Process Rights in State v. 
Loomis, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 75, 92 (2016) (citing due process concerns 
stemming from a defendant’s inability to “refute, supplement, and explain” the 
algorithm’s formula at sentencing and the lack of individualized sentencing in the 
process). 
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Columbia; Cook County, Illinois; Santa Cruz County, California; 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania; Harris County, Texas; and 
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina.58 Kentucky, in particular, has 
been viewed as a national model in pretrial procedure,59 remaining 
at the forefront with its adoption of algorithmic approaches to bail. 
Many other jurisdictions, such as Mecklenburg County, have sought 
reform measures in an effort to address unresolved issues in their 
respective systems, such as jail overcrowding and the prospective 
costs of new housing facilities.60 Additionally, New York City has 
adopted the use of algorithms in multiple areas of its criminal justice 
system.61 City officials recently passed a bill to test its formulaic 
system for bias and to develop a process for citizens to request 
explanations of algorithmic decisions when they are dissatisfied 
with particular outcomes.62 This “open source” bill is believed to be 
                                                 
 58 As of 2017, Kentucky, Arizona, and New Jersey were the only states to have 
implemented the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment statewide. 
PRETRIAL JUST. INST., WHERE PRETRIAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE HAPPENING 4 (July 
2017), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NCJA/c3320104-776e-
4e0e-b687-4ffa1fd54e8c/UploadedImages/National%20Forum/2017%20Forum
/fanno-burdeen-where-pretrial-improvements-2017.pdf. 
 59 See ARNOLD FOUND., RESULTS FROM THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE PUBLIC 
SAFETY ASSESSMENT – COURT IN KENTUCKY 2 (July 2014), 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/PSA-Court-
Kentucky-6-Month-Report.pdf (noting Kentucky’s past as an early adopter and 
innovative leader in pretrial reform efforts). 
 60 See Safety and Justice Challenge, MECKNC.GOV., 
https://www.mecknc.gov/CriminalJusticeServices/Pages/SJC.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2018); see also Keith Humphreys, Why America’s Jails Are So 
Overcrowded, N.Y. POST (Apr. 26, 2017, 5:02 AM), https://nypost.com/2017/04
/26/why-americas-jails-are-so-overcrowded/. Due to its high population, jail 
overcrowding has been a continuing problem in Mecklenburg County for well 
over a decade. See Chris Fitzsimon, Jail Overcrowding Critical, Sheriff Says, N.C. 
POL’Y WATCH (Sept. 5, 2006), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2006/09/05/jail-
overcrowding-critical-sheriff-says/. 
 61 See Roshan Abraham, New York City Passes Bill to Study Biases in 
Algorithms Used by the City, MOTHERBOARD (Dec. 19, 2017, 9:52 AM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/xw4xdw/new-york-city-algorithmic-
bias-bill-law. 
 62 An earlier version of the bill required “all agencies that perform algorithmic 
decision-making—from policing to public school assignments—make their code 
publicly available.” Id. at 61. Its final version requires a task force to develop a 
procedure which detects algorithmic bias to “determine whether an agency 
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one of the first of its kind and has been commended for its accessible 
ingenuity.63 
However, not everyone is convinced that algorithmic procedure 
is the way of the future. As of 2015, fewer than ten percent of all 
jurisdictions had used a method of formal risk assessment when 
setting bail.64 Anne Milgram, former attorney general of New Jersey, 
explains that “[s]uch assessments are costly to conduct and are 
sometimes discounted by judges because they depend on 
information reported by defendants.”65 Other critics believe 
algorithms threaten the idea that people want judges who use their 
“life experience, common sense, and ethics” to guide their decision 
making rather than relying on a formula.66 Concerns over bias and 
discrimination have erupted with the implementation of algorithmic 
decision-making in other parts of the criminal justice process, 
namely at the sentencing stage.67 In light of these apprehensions 
toward the adoption of formulaic methodology to aid decision-
making in the criminal justice system, the duty of proving the 
effectiveness of reform efforts falls to those jurisdictions that have 
already implemented algorithmic risk assessment into their bail 
determination process. 
                                                 
automated decision system disproportionately impacts persons [on an 
impermissible basis] . . . .” Id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-
granting-of-bail-into-a-science.html. 
 65 Id. While the research and testing required to formulate such algorithms is 
extensive, tools such as the PSA can be implemented with minimal expense and 
even reduce costs in the long run by not requiring additional staff to conduct 
individual defendant interviews and enhancing judicial efficiency. ARNOLD 
FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 4 
(2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF-
research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf. 
 66 See Klingensmith, supra note 51 (believing these algorithms to be 
compulsory, rather than a tool to supplement the common sense and experience 
of judicial officials). 
 67 See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016); Criminal Law – 
Sentencing Guidelines – Wisconsin Supreme Court Requires Warning Before Use 
of Algorithmic Risk Assessments in Sentencing – State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 
(Wis. 2016), 130 HARV. L. REV. 1530 (2017); Freeman, supra note 57. 
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III. THE PSA AND MECKLENBURG COUNTY 
There has been a noticeable shift in approaches to bail procedure 
over the last decade, with many courts moving away from systems 
driven by rigid, offense-focused bail schedules in favor of “rigorous, 
scientific, data-driven risk assessments.”68 Among the jurisdictions 
at the forefront of utilizing risk assessment factors in its bail 
determination procedures is Mecklenburg County, the most 
populous county in North Carolina and home to the city of Charlotte. 
Due to its large population, Mecklenburg County demands a high 
degree of efficiency from its court system to ease the burden of 
overcrowded dockets and to ensure the fair and reasonable 
administration of justice.69 To achieve this goal, Mecklenburg 
County became one of the first jurisdictions in the country—and to 
date, the only jurisdiction in North Carolina—to adopt the Laura and 
John Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment tool 
(hereinafter referred to as the PSA).70 Since implementing the PSA, 
both defendants and the community of Mecklenburg County have 
experienced immensely positive results, demonstrating the benefits 
of algorithmic risk assessment in comparison to heavy reliance on 
traditional bail schedules corresponding to monetary constraints.71 
A. The PSA’s Approach to Bail Reform 
The Laura and John Arnold Foundation is a philanthropic 
organization with a mission to “improve the lives of individuals by 
strengthening our social, governmental, and economic systems.”72 
Arnold Foundation researchers compiled 1.5 million criminal cases 
                                                 
 68 Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 
2016 BYU L. REV. 837, 867 (2016) (citation omitted). 
 69 See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 4. 
 70 ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 10. 
 71 See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 4; Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4 
(discussing the decrease in jail population, increased efficiency of the court 
system, and extrinsic benefits to the community resulting from the PSA-Court’s 
utilization in Mecklenburg County). 
 72 About LJAF, ARNOLD FOUND., http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/about/ (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
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gathered from approximately 300 different U.S. jurisdictions.73 
From these cases, the Foundation’s research team studied 746,525 
cases of defendants who had been released pretrial before their 
disposition.74 The initial analysis examined hundreds of factors 
including prior instances of failure to appear for court, drug and 
alcohol use, mental health, family relations, residency status, and 
employment history, among others.75 Researchers found that a small 
number of factors obtained at the administrative level could 
accurately predict a defendant’s risk level.76 Additionally, inclusion 
of factors relating to a defendant’s personal background gathered at 
an in-person interview with pretrial services resulted in no positive 
effect on the algorithm’s performance.77 Removing these factors 
from consideration created a methodical tool, derived from readily 
accessible administrative factors, that eliminated the need for costly, 
time-consuming pretrial interviews whose variables often 
inadvertently contribute to formulaic bias.78 The resulting algorithm 
produced two scores in line with those produced by the traditional 
factors courts use to evaluate pretrial detention, one predicting the 
defendant’s risk of flight and the other assessing the danger they 
pose to the community if released pending trial.79 
The PSA quantitates values for flight risk and safety of the 
community through the use of three separate risk assessment scales 
ranging from a low of one to a high of six.80 The first two scales 
represent “dangerousness predictions,” broken down into “new 
criminal activity” and “new violent criminal activity,” 
respectively.81 The third scale predicts the risk of a defendant’s 
                                                 
 73 Public Safety Assessment, ARNOLD FOUND., http://www.arnoldfoundation.org
/initiative/criminal-justice/crime-prevention/public-safety-assessment/ (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2018). 
 74 ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 65, at 3. 
 75 Id. at 3–4. 
 76 These administrative factors determined when the defendant is processed, 
mainly relating to information available from their criminal background history. 
Id. 
 77 See id. at 4. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See Gouldin, supra note 68, at 869. 
 80 See id. at 870. 
 81 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
APR. 2018] Risk Assessment Algorithms 235 
“failure to appear.”82 The values assigned to each of these three 
scales are derived from a series of nine factors: whether the charged 
offense is violent, other pending charges, prior misdemeanor 
convictions, prior felony convictions, prior violent convictions, 
prior failure to appear pretrial within the last two years, prior failure 
to appear pretrial outside the last two years, prior convictions 
resulting in incarceration, and age at the time of arrest.83 None of 
these nine factors require individual defendant interviews as all are 
determined through administrative information capable of being 
automatically compiled prior to an initial bail hearing.84 The PSA’s 
creators claim the algorithm is “more objective, far less expensive, 
and requires fewer resources to administer than previous 
techniques.”85 Professor Lauryn Gouldin, former Assistant Director 
of the Center for Research in Crime and Justice at New York 
University School of Law, has praised the algorithm, stating “[t]oo 
many of the federal and state risk assessment tools merge the 
analysis of flight risk and dangerousness into a single risk 
assessment calculation, the PSA-Court risk assessment tool being a 
notable exception.”86 
The Arnold Foundation also took steps to minimize algorithmic 
bias in the PSA risk assessment tool.87 Unlike many of the factors at 
issue with predictive policing algorithms,88 the PSA tool excludes 
variables involving race, gender, income, education, home address, 
history of drug use, family status, marital status, national origin, 
employment, or religion.89 Additionally, the Arnold Foundation 
stresses that the PSA analysis is not the only information a judge 
should consider when determining bail.90 The PSA is merely one of 
                                                 
 82 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83 ARNOLD FOUND., THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT (PSA) 1 (2016), 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/PSA-Infographic.pdf. 
 84 See Gouldin, supra note 68, at 870. 
 85 Id. (quoting ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 83). 
 86 Id. at 870–71. 
 87 See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 83 (“The PSA provides information that is 
race- and gender- neutral. It helps . . . enhance fairness and efficiency in the 
system.”). 
 88 See Ferguson, supra note 52, at 265. 
 89 See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 83. 
 90 See id. 
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several tools at a judge’s disposal to guide their decision-making 
process, with the goal of “increas[ing] safety, reduc[ing] taxpayer 
costs, and enhanc[ing] fairness and efficiency in the system.”91 
The PSA’s effectiveness as a risk assessment tool is best 
illustrated by comparing its outcomes to those produced by a 
traditional bail schedule. In North Carolina, it is statutorily required 
that the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge for each judicial 
district publish established bail policies to guide pretrial release.92 
During the transition in which the PSA was first implemented in 
Mecklenburg County, the Bail Policy for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial 
District93 was revised to reflect the new methodology. The PSA 
matrix is specifically included in the policy,94 noting recommended 
action by taking both the flight risk of the defendant and the danger 
they pose to the community into consideration.95 The policy’s 
recommended bail schedule most acutely represents these changes 
when compared to other jurisdictions’ schedules within the state. 
For example, suppose a young man with limited prior 
convictions is caught with a needle and heroin. The young man is 
then charged with possession of a Schedule I controlled substance,96 
a Class I felony in North Carolina.97 Under Mecklenburg’s policy, 
the schedule recommends bail ranging from $0 to $25,000,98 more 
narrowly tailored after performing a PSA risk analysis. Because the 
defendant presents no danger to the community and limited risk of 
flight, he would likely be released on an unsecured bond or its 
equivalent pending trial, while also being afforded the opportunity 
                                                 
 91 Id. 
 92 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-535(a) (2016). 
 93 Order Establishing Bail Policy for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, 14-R 
1615, 1 (2014), https://www.mecknc.gov/CriminalJusticeServices/Documents
/Mecklenburg%20County%20Bail%20Policy.pdf (outlining Mecklenburg 
County’s recommended monetary amounts and factors to be considered when 
determining conditions of release). 
 94 See id. at 22, Exhibit C. 
 95 Id. at 1. 
 96 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-89(a)(j) (2016). 
 97 Id. § 90-95(d)(1). 
 98 Order Establishing Bail Policy for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, supra 
note 93, at 16. 
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to enroll in a drug rehabilitation program.99 This outcome changes 
dramatically when an individual under the same circumstances is 
charged with possession in a jurisdiction that has not adopted 
algorithmic risk assessment, such as Wake County, North Carolina. 
Under Wake County’s bail policy,100 it is recommended that the 
same defendant charged with a Class I felony be allocated a $2,000 
to $10,000 secured bond as a condition of release.101 While the 
policy stipulates that these amounts are general guidelines for 
release,102 based upon the limited facts available at the initial bail 
determination hearing and a quick glance of the file only revealing 
“Possession of a Schedule I Controlled Substance,” this could easily 
lead a judicial official to impose the $2,000 recommended 
minimum. If this defendant cannot afford to pay a bail bonding 
company $200 for release,103 they will remain in custody pending 
trial, keeping them from receiving the drug treatment they need out 
of custody, all while the community pays to house them in an 
already overcrowded jail system.104 The above example 
demonstrates the equitable impact an algorithm-based risk 
assessment tool may have over jurisdictions relying on traditional 
bail schedules and determination methods. 
However, despite the new implementations, conventional 
factors for determining release have not been completely eradicated 
from consideration under the Mecklenburg bail policy. In contrast 
to the risk assessment values used by the PSA, the bail policy 
maintains traditional variables for analyzing flight risk and 
community safety, which a judicial official must evaluate when 
                                                 
 99 Depending on the extent of the defendant’s prior convictions, he would likely 
be considered for conditional discharge under North Carolina’s drug education 
program if he qualifies. The North Carolina Drug Education School Program, 
N.C. DRUG EDUC. SCH., https://ncdes.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
 100 Administrative Order Setting Tenth Judicial District Pretrial Release 
Policies 1 (2013), http://www.ncids.org/racebank/Pretrial/Administrative
%20Order%20Setting%2010th%20Judicial%20District%20Pretrial%20Release
%20Policies.pdf. 
 101 Id. at 6. 
 102 Id. at 5. 
 103 The cost of a bondsman charging an ordinary fee of ten percent for bail of 
$2000 would be $200. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 12, at 106. 
 104 See Fitzsimon, supra note 60. 
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setting the terms for pretrial release.105 Many of the considered 
factors, such as subsection (C) of the Bail Policy for the Twenty-
Sixth Judicial District, which regards “[t]he defendant’s family ties, 
employment, financial resources, character, and mental 
condition,”106 appear to undermine the solely administrative 
variables utilized by the PSA tool, functioning as proxies for the 
very race and gender bias the algorithmic approach seeks to 
eliminate.107 Nonetheless, while maintaining these factors may not 
appear ideal, their inclusion preserves the independent discretion of 
the judiciary while reinforcing the fact that the PSA is not a binding 
instrument but rather a resource to be used to form an appropriate 
and equitable assessment for conditions of release pending trial. The 
positive results Mecklenburg County has experienced from 
implementing the PSA speak to the powerful role algorithmic risk 
assessment tools may serve in bail reform efforts moving forward. 
B. Implementation in Mecklenburg County and Positive Outcomes 
Government officials in Mecklenburg County were faced with 
the prospect of reforming its bail system well over a decade before 
the PSA came into existence.108 From 1990 to 2008, Charlotte’s 
population grew at a rate of 70%, while the county’s jail population 
increased by 179%.109 The number of detained individuals led to a 
problem of jail overcrowding that existing housing facilities could 
not maintain long-term.110 This left the county with two options—
construct new jail housing facilities to account for the increased 
detention rate, at an immense cost to the community,111 or implement 
                                                 
 105 See Order Establishing Bail Policy for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, 
supra note 93, at 2. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 83. 
 108 See KIMME & ASSOCS., INC. ET AL., MECKLENBURG COUNTY, NC 
DETENTION-CORRECTIONS MASTER PLAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (2008), 
https://www.charmeck.org/mecklenburg/county/countymanagersoffice/omb/capi
talprojects/documents/shf-exec%20sum%20meck%202008.pdf. 
 109 Id. at 1. 
 110 Id. at 1–2. 
 111 The estimated construction and additional operating costs to meet baseline 
needs were broken down into three projections, totaling annual cost increases of 
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a series of policy measures to reduce the detention rate to a 
manageable level, including a revision of bail setting and pretrial 
release methodology.112 While attempts at reform were 
implemented, jail overcrowding remained a continuing problem in 
Mecklenburg County until the PSA was adopted in 2014.113 
Perhaps the most insightful source for assessing the 
effectiveness of the PSA and application of algorithmic bail 
procedures in Mecklenburg County is the group of judicial officials 
responsible for determining pretrial release. In June 2015, the 
Arnold Foundation interviewed Chief District Court Judge Regan 
Miller on his opinion of the PSA and its usefulness.114 Judge Miller 
began by questioning the fairness of the idea that “everybody 
charged with a certain crime was going to be initially started at a 
monetary bond at a certain amount” and the inequities experienced 
by defendants of limited means.115 Judge Miller continued by noting 
the negative effects experienced by defendants detained for more 
than two days, namely losing their jobs and members of their family 
and the community believing they are already guilty of the charges 
against them.116 Judge Miller commended the PSA for the 
information it provides, its objective fairness, and its function as a 
safeguard from judges being governed by their own implicit bias.117 
More recently, in a radio interview from December 2017, 
District Court Judge Elizabeth Trosch further emphasized the PSA’s 
benefits to both the defendants and the greater community.118 Judge 
Trosch articulated that in many local jails, while half of the 
defendants in custody have a low flight risk and are not a danger to 
the community, they remain detained “because they are unable to 
pay a money bond in order to secure their release.”119 This prevents 
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 112 See id. at 5–8. 
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these defendants from “go[ing] back to work and their families 
while their case is being processed in the court system.”120 A risk 
assessment tool such as the PSA provides a more targeted 
assessment of these factors tailored to the individual, rather than a 
more rigid, offense-driven system such as a traditional bail schedule, 
allowing judicial officials to reach a more efficient and equitable 
bail determination. In 2014, Mecklenburg County spent $113 
million on inmate housing, roughly $166 per day per defendant—an 
amount Judge Trosch criticizes as “a lot of money to jail people who 
do not pose a serious threat to public safety.”121 According to Judge 
Trosch, by using the PSA for the past five years, Mecklenburg 
County has been able to safely reduce its jail population by 
approximately forty percent.122 The far-reaching benefits of the PSA 
are not just acknowledged by the judiciary but by other actors in the 
criminal justice system as well.123 
Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike support the 
effectiveness of the PSA.124 Former Mecklenburg County District 
Attorney Andrew Murray125 noted, “the risk assessment has allowed 
us to lower the number of the jail population [while] continu[ing] to 
lower the crime rate here in Mecklenburg County.”126 Like his 
colleagues on the bench, Mr. Murray observed the PSA offers value 
by promoting consistency amongst judges and by providing 
“something that is data-driven, that is not subjective.”127 Mr. Murray 
emphasized many of the same beneficial effects the tool has had on 
the system referenced by the county’s judicial officials such as tax 
savings to the community and the lack of the adverse consequences 
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 122 Id.; see also ARNOLD FOUND., District Attorney Andrew Murray (June 
2015), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/videos/district-attorney-andrew-murray/ 
(supporting the specific claim that the reduction has maintained safety). 
 123 See Dewan, supra note 64. 
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pretrial confinement imposes on defendants.128 Similarly, 
Mecklenburg County Public Defender Kevin Tully supports the 
PSA’s function in furthering bail reform efforts, believing the tool 
is not only useful for judicial officials but also benefits his attorneys 
on staff, allowing them to more effectively advocate on behalf of 
their indigent clients.129 Overall, the PSA has had a meaningful, 
lasting impact on Mecklenburg County’s bail procedure and has led 
to beneficial outcomes in every corner of the criminal justice 
system. 
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR AN ALGORITHMIC APPROACH TO BAIL 
REFORM 
As of August 2017, the use of the PSA had expanded from its 
initial pilot sites and had been adopted in over two dozen 
jurisdictions throughout the United States.130 The Arnold Foundation 
expressed a goal in 2013 “that every judge in America will use a 
data-driven, objective risk assessment within the next five years.”131 
Now, five years later, one must wonder why the majority of 
jurisdictions, including North Carolina’s other ninety-nine counties, 
have resisted change and remain entrenched in an archaic system of 
bail schedules rooted in monetary constraints. 
A. Benefits to Defendants, the Criminal Justice System, and the 
Community 
The benefits of an algorithmic bail system become apparent 
when examining the effects the PSA has had in Mecklenburg 
County.132 Traditional bail schedules impose financial limitations 
that often prevent an individual from obtaining release before trial.133 
                                                 
 128 See Dewan, supra note 64. 
 129 See ARNOLD FOUND., Public Defender Kevin Tully (June 2015), 
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Many indigent defendants who pose neither a danger to public safety 
nor risk of flight nonetheless remain in custody, unable to turn to 
even a private bail bonding company for release.134 Algorithmic 
techniques benefit these individuals, who would otherwise be 
ineligible for release under a uniform, offense-focused bail 
schedule. Less time in custody translates to lower recidivism rates,135 
likely because individual defendants spend less time behind bars 
exposed to more severe offenders.136 Additionally, defendants that 
spend less time behind bars can retain their jobs on release.137 
Unemployment resulting from failure to report for work, or in 
response to notifying management of incarceration, makes 
individuals prone to reoffending as a result of financial necessity.138 
Using algorithmic tools to emphasize the low risk a defendant poses 
to the community allows individuals who would otherwise remain 
detained under a traditional bail schedule to keep their jobs and care 
for their children while they await trial. 
In addition to tangible benefits for defendants released pretrial, 
an algorithmic system promotes non-discriminatory procedural 
tools, ensuring constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due 
process remain intact. In ODonnell v. Harris County,139 a federal 
district court granted a preliminary injunction barring the detention 
of indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors who remained 
in custody solely because of their inability to pay.140 In evaluating 
the county’s risk assessment tool, the court emphasized the issue by 
requiring an intermediate standard of “careful review,”141 as opposed 
                                                 
 134 See Brookland & Stasio, supra note 4. 
 135 See LOWENKAMP ET AL., supra note 42. 
 136 See id. 
 137 See ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 4. 
 138 See id. 
 139 ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
 140 See id. at 1059. On the facts of the case, the federal district court concluded 
more than 100 individuals were detained in the Harris County Jail, who although 
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 141 The opinion cites to the Supreme Court’s definition of “careful review” for 
wealth-based classifications, “requir[ing] a careful inquiry into such factors as 
‘the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the 
rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, [and] the 
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to a rational basis standard, which is typically required for wealth-
based classifications because of the individual liberty threatened by 
detention.142 The Fifth Circuit recently upheld the district court’s 
application of intermediate scrutiny, holding that, while “neither 
prisoners nor indigents constitute a suspect class . . . heightened 
scrutiny is required when criminal laws detain poor 
defendants because of their indigence.”143 The court’s heightened 
review of the county’s risk assessment practices demonstrates the 
importance of algorithmic bail procedures functioning as a tool to 
protect the accused’s right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Judicial efficiency is more important than ever given the 
continually stifled resources of the criminal justice system.144 The 
scope of efficiency created by algorithmic bail procedures is not 
limited to that experienced by judicial officials as a result of lower 
docket sizes145 but also allows prosecutors to more effectively 
manage caseloads,146 attorneys to more fervently advocate on behalf 
of their clients,147 and jail personnel to more easily monitor 
defendants while the case is pending.148 Having fewer defendants in 
custody significantly reduces safety concerns due to overcrowded 
jail populations,149 and also allows less severe cases to be resolved 
more productively. This eliminates the need to confine and transport 
defendants who have been detained for minor offenses, such as 
failure to pay a fine. All of these effects demonstrate the increased 
efficiency algorithmic techniques lend to bail procedure and the 
management of judicial resources. 
                                                 
existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose.’” Id. at 1137 (citing 
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Moreover, the use of algorithms promotes public confidence in 
the justice system.150 Embracing more equitable methods of pretrial 
risk assessment backed by proven algorithmic procedure decreases 
the largely unchecked power the bail bonding industry has over 
defendants,151 reversing the privatization of individuals’ freedom 
and liberty and bringing these back into the scope of the public 
justice system. The increased fairness created through the use of 
these non-discriminatory factors promotes greater public confidence 
in the justice system as a result.152 Simultaneously, the safety of the 
community benefits by having a system focused on prosecuting 
more severe offenders in conjunction with the cost-savings of a 
reduced jail population.153 Jurisdictions must ask themselves if it 
makes sense to detain an individual for failure to pay a $150 fine 
when it costs the public $166 a day to house them.154 
B. Cautionary Measures: Accounting for Algorithmic Bias and 
Systemic Limitations 
Notwithstanding the wide-ranging benefits of an algorithmic 
risk assessment system in determining bail, there are also pitfalls 
that must be avoided in utilizing the methodology. Removing 
personal bias from a mechanical algorithm does not necessarily 
make it “color-blind.”155 In 2016, an algorithm used in the Broward 
County, Florida, criminal justice system was found to have 
“wrongly labelled black people as future criminals nearly twice as 
                                                 
 150 For a discussion of how the perception of fairness functions as a central 
cornerstone of the criminal process, see Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstones of the 
Judicial Process, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 20–21 (1993). 
 151 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 12, at 106. 
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often as whites.”156 Race need not be explicitly written into an 
algorithm’s code to produce discriminatory and disproportionate 
results. Bias may result from pretrial release factors serving as 
proxies for other criteria such as poverty, as seen in examples 
including “whether a defendant has a working telephone, whether 
they live with a parent or spouse, and whether they’re employed in 
a training program.”157 
The threat of proxy variables has spurred concerns of 
algorithmic bias in other areas of the law as well.158 One such 
example is found between using discriminatory proxy variables in 
bail algorithms and the unlawful housing practice of redlining.159 
From the 1930s through the 1960s, the U.S. Federal Housing 
Administration manipulated risk factor formulas to methodically 
exclude minority groups from obtaining loans in certain 
communities.160 Even creditworthy minority applicants were 
systematically denied their applications under the facially neutral 
policy simply because they resided in low-income areas.161 The 
inequitable practice was outlawed by the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 
but its chilling aftermath continues to manifest itself in large urban 
areas to this day.162 If not properly implemented, algorithms used in 
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the criminal justice context are just as vulnerable to the biased 
processes found in redlining.163 An inherent tension results in which 
efforts to minimize violent crime must be balanced with fair and 
equitable procedure.164 Risk assessment tools, such as the PSA, 
demonstrate that a “single-threshold rule” focused purely on 
administrative variables (as opposed to “race-specific thresholds”)165 
can maximize public safety while simultaneously satisfying core 
constitutional principles of fairness in the judicial process. 
Potential bias in algorithmic methods can indeed be limited. 
“Machines are trained to find patterns that predict future criminality 
from past data. They can therefore be told to find patterns that both 
predict criminality and avoid disproportionate false categorisation 
of . . . future offenders.”166 The true benefit of algorithms lies in the 
fact that “predictive software will only base its results on the formal 
factors that are coded into its system,” avoiding unconscious, 
implicit human bias in its decision-making capabilities.167 Proven 
algorithmic assessments like the PSA have been extensively tested168 
to ensure a process of decision-making free from biased outcomes 
not meant to be “tweaked” by jurisdictions choosing to adopt 
them.169 Ensuring the software itself is free from biased proxies is 
crucial to the effective implementation of risk assessment 
algorithms in the criminal justice system. 
Opponents claim algorithms impose limits on the open nature of 
the judicial process, pointing to the secrecy shrouding the 
proprietary makeup of certain formulas, particularly those used in 
the sentencing process.170 While this logic may apply to certain 
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portions of the judicial process, it is important not to rule out the use 
of risk assessments from every area. Some algorithms used in the 
sentencing phase have left defendants unable to examine the factors 
determining their fate, garnering due process and equal protection 
concerns from courts and scholars alike.171 However, in other 
contexts, such as predictive policing, concealing the variables 
comprising an algorithm may be necessary to prevent savvy 
criminals from working around its safeguard strategy. The use of 
algorithms in the context of bail procedure is separate and distinct 
from each of the above concerns. Unlike sentencing algorithms, bail 
algorithms such as the PSA are designed to be shared publicly and 
seek to offer universal application to the widest range of 
jurisdictions possible.172 While the adoption of these risk assessment 
tools is ultimately implemented by the legislature, their formulation 
by private research organizations dedicated to improving equity in 
the criminal justice system, in conjunction with police, judicial 
officials, and in some cases, the voting public, only furthers the 
value of an open, transparent bail reform policy benefiting both 
defendants and the community. 
Bail algorithms are not yet a wholly perfect solution to resolving 
the conflicting principles at stake with pretrial release. In July 2017, 
a defendant in San Francisco was charged with the murder of a local 
photographer after being released by a judge pretrial for a separate 
offense on recommendation of his PSA score.173 Critics quickly 
attacked the tool following the tragedy.174 Chris Blaylock, a New 
Jersey bail bondsman and opponent of the Arnold Foundation, 
claimed the PSA’s “sole purpose is to promote the mass release of 
offenders with the least restrictive conditions possible regardless of 
                                                 
(criticizing the COMPAS tool for its lack of transparency surrounding its 
sentencing methodology). 
 171 See id. See generally Freeman, supra note 57 (arguing that courts need to 
ensure proper due process protection prior to using algorithms during sentencing). 
 172 See Schuppe, supra note 130. 
 173 See Eric Westervelt, Did a Bail Reform Algorithm Contribute to This San 
Francisco Man’s Murder?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 18, 2017, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/08/18/543976003/did-a-bail-reform-algorithm-
contribute-to-this-san-francisco-man-s-murder. 
 174 See id. 
248 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. [VOL. 19: 221 
the charges.”175 Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney Eric Siddall 
raised concerns about the difficulty for judges to overturn decisions 
“couched in science,” noting fear of being overturned for keeping a 
defendant in custody.176 In this instance, the non-profit organization 
Pretrial Diversion Project, who compiles the PSA analysis for the 
sheriff’s office, admitted to miscalculating the length of this 
defendant’s jail time producing an incorrect PSA score.177 Tragedies 
such as this emphasize the need to maintain judicial discretion 
throughout the criminal process, accentuating that algorithms are 
simply another instrument in a judge’s arsenal to determine 
appropriate conditions of release pending trial. The overall 
effectiveness of algorithms serving as risk assessment tools is 
limited by the willingness of judicial officials to take the 
recommendations under advisement in conjunction with their own 
experience and understanding of the law. The commitment of early 
adopters is necessary to prove the effectiveness of risk assessment 
tools in practice, only increasing over time as technology develops, 
algorithms become increasingly automated, and human error is 
removed from the process. 
C. Future Steps and Policy Measures in Pursuit of Reform  
While avoiding bias in the process of implementing effective 
bail algorithms, courts and researchers alike can look to other areas 
of the criminal justice system, such as juvenile justice, for the best 
approach to putting these new policies into effect. When evaluating 
pretrial detention in the juvenile context, courts must consider non-
monetary “community-based supervision strategies” that have 
results proven to lower recidivism, allow for more resources devoted 
to public safety, and reduce racial disparity in the process.178 
Applying these same strategies to the adult criminal system appears 
logical in light of continuing studies revealing adolescent maturity 
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of the brain extends well into a child’s mid-twenties,179 particularly 
when “young adults aged 18-to-24 constitute 10 percent of the 
population but 30 percent of arrests.”180 Critics claim that these 
techniques, often centered around rehabilitative goals, are “soft on 
crime,” but the resulting effects are just the opposite.181 
Rehabilitative approaches have been proven to reduce crime long 
term by providing young defendants the help they need and through 
individualized treatment and assessments, in addition to keeping a 
conviction off of their record that will follow them the rest of their 
lives.182 The rationale of these strategies can equally be applied to 
the adult criminal system, as rehabilitative pretrial programs outside 
of juvenile justice are already in effect in some jurisdictions.183 Much 
like algorithmic risk assessments, the pretrial procedures of the 
juvenile justice system are grounded in an assessment and strategy-
based approach most appropriate for the individual defendant. A 
traditional bail schedule denoting particular monetary conditions for 
enumerated offenses only fosters recidivism among defendants who 
cannot afford release, jeopardizing public confidence in the criminal 
justice system as a whole. 
Jurisdictions throughout the country are beginning to take notice 
of the value algorithms offer as tools aiding efforts to maintain the 
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balance of cases proceeding efficiently in court and keeping 
communities safe. In May 2015, Chief Justice Mark Martin of the 
North Carolina Supreme Court formed the North Carolina 
Commission on the Administration of Law and Justice, tasked with 
evaluating the state’s court system and making recommendations for 
reforming the judicial process “within the existing administrative 
framework.”184 The Commission’s Final Report, released in March 
2017, recommended the statewide adoption of various reform 
methods—including the endorsement of the PSA—largely due to 
the algorithm’s successful implementation in Mecklenburg 
County.185 These reform measures have not been limited to the state 
arena but are beginning to take effect at the federal level as well. 
Senators Kamala Harris (D-CA) and Rand Paul (R-KY) have 
drafted bipartisan legislation with the central goals of “ensuring that 
no-one is detained simply because they are poor, and restoring a 
presumption of release for most defendants.”186 The proposed 
legislation seeks to achieve these goals through the use of algorithm-
based risk assessment tools, such as the PSA, with the Senators 
claiming the added benefit of “restor[ing] Americans’ faith in our 
justice system.”187 
V. CONCLUSION 
A leading authority on criminal law and procedure, Professor 
Jerold Israel188 has identified a series of nine “cornerstone 
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objectives” embodying the “basic structure and the governing legal 
principles” of the judicial process.189 Among these cornerstones, 
three emerge as encapsulating the values pretrial detention hearings 
seek to accomplish: “Respecting the Dignity of the Individual,” 
“Maintaining the Appearance of Fairness,” and “Achieving Equality 
in the Application of the Process.”190 Risk assessment algorithms 
seek to further these three goals by correcting inequities present in 
the traditional bail schedule relying on imposed monetary conditions 
in order to function as intended. Defendants who neither pose a 
danger to the public safety nor risk of flight are identified as such. 
They are then released to their families and permitted to return to 
their jobs in lieu of remaining in custody at the expense of the 
taxpayer. 
Despite the pronounced benefits of an algorithm-based bail 
determination process, many jurisdictions remain slow to embrace 
the reformed methodology in favor of the outdated procedures. They 
may be wary of a loss of discretion in the hands of their judges, or 
perhaps concerned with the notion of a formula systematically 
identifying groups of people as future offenders of criminal activity. 
The reality is that algorithms function as tools for judges to use in 
order to most effectively protect their communities while ensuring 
compliance with the criminal justice system. Bail reform legislation 
has been successful as a result of “a growing awareness that too 
many low-risk defendants stay behind bars because they are poor 
while too many dangerous defendants exploit the money bail system 
and are released with little to no supervision.”191 When implemented 
correctly through data-driven, proven analysis, risk assessment 
algorithms provide an answer to the question of how to correct the 
present inequities that exist in the traditional method of following a 
bail schedule corresponding to the offense committed and not the 
individual being detained. 
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